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RESUMEN 
 
En este trabajo, se estudia la presencia de quiebres estructurales en los flujos 
de capitales de 16 economías de Latinoamérica usando el test de raíz unitaria 
de Zivot y Andrews (1992). Para complementar el análisis, se utiliza el test de 
quiebres estructurales de Bai Perron (1998). Luego, se procede a analizar la 
posibilidad de contemporaneidad entre los quiebres encontrados y las crisis 
que tales países sufrieron en los últimos 40 años. Dichas crisis pueden ser de 
moneda, bancarias, domésticas o de deuda externa. Se encontraron muchos 
casos de contemporaneidad, especialmente con las crisis que ocurrieron al 
final de los 90s. 
Clasificación JEL: C10, G01, N26 
Palabras Clave: quiebres estructurales, volatilidad, flujos de capital, crisis, 
contemporaneidad. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the presence of structural breaks in the capital flows of 
sixteen economies of Latin America using the unit test root by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992). It is complemented by the structural breaks test by Bai 
Perron (1998). Afterwards, an analysis of the likelihood of contemporaneity 
between the breaks found and the crises the countries had suffered in the last 
forty years is presented. These crises were either of currency, banking, 
domestic and external debt type. Many cases of contemporaneity were found, 
especially with the crises that occurred at the end of the 90s. 
JEL Classification: C10, G01, N26 
Keywords: structural breaks, volatility, capital flows, crises, contemporaneity. 
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I. Introduction 
The present paper highlights the high volatility of capital flows in Latin 
America and its relationship with the crises that took place in the last quarter 
of the previous century. The main hypothesis is that the high volatility of the 
capital flows of foreign and domestic agents show the presence of possible 
structural breaks. 
In an attempt to confront this hypothesis, the test proposed by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) is used.It tests stationarity and indirectly presents a date as a 
possible break. That is, the test endogenously finds possible breaks (this is the 
main difference with other tests, like Chow’s) and allows confronting that 
dates with the crises dates. 
The results are obtained in two stages. First, it is found that in most cases 
significant breaks arose in the series. Afterwards, the contrast among breaks 
and crises yields contemporaneity in a large number of cases, especially for 
crises taking place at the end of the nineties and breaks in the flows happening 
at the beginning of the 2000s. 
These results suggest a strong correlation between structural changes in the 
financial flows in and out of Latin America and their crises. While no causal 
connection can be ascertained, this indicates that one of the weakest aspects of 
the growth process in Latin America can be found in the flow of capital, which 
seems associated to increased instability. 
 
II. Evolution of the financial architecture since 1945 
II.1.  First part - Bretton Woods (1945 - 1971) 
 
The period considered begins with an attempt to reconstruct the world’s 
economy, agreed in Bretton Woods by the Allied powers3 in 1945. The plan 
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was meant to put an end to the continuous financial crisis, the devaluations, the 
hyperinflations and the restrictions to international trade (originated in 
mismatches in the balance of payments), which were considered the main 
obstacles towards recovery after the First World War and the 1929 crisis of 
Wall Street. 
Additionally, the real sector of the world’s economy was devastated. At the 
end of the war Europe was almost paralyzed; mainly England and France, who 
had suffered great casualties, and Germany that had not only suffered a 
massive destruction of its productive structure but also had to paid the cost of 
the war as a consequence of being defeated. 
The industrial production in 1946 was only 60% of the levels it had before 
the war. The real sector was one of the most complicated in terms of 
recovering the prewar production. The situation was even worse than at the 
end of the First World War. 
The aid provided by the USA was very important for diminishing the 
impact of the aftermath of the war. Under the Mashall Plan four billion dollars 
were injected into Europe in the first two years of its application.4 
Among the effects of the Marshall Plan, the most important ones were that 
the dollars received affected positively both the investment levels (the 
countries which got more money from this aid invested more) and 
consumption. From every dollar received from the plan 65 cents were devoted 
to increase consumption while 35 cents raised investment. Moreover, the 
returns of new investments were very high:5 every extra dollar which was 
invested increased in 50 cents the product of the next year. 
In order to solve financial sector problems the agreement of Bretton Woods 
established the next steps to follow: fixing the exchange rate in relationship 
with the dollar, exchange rates were fixed but adjustable in response to 
“fundamental disequilibria”, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was 
                                                                                                                     
3 The meeting took place in New Hampshire in July 1944 with the presence of representatives of 
44 countries. 
4 Between 1948 and 1951, the US government under this plan spent 13.2 billions of dollars, and 
the main receptors of that money were the United Kingdom and France. 
5 This fact can be easily understood taking into account that the economies were devastated; also 
the consumption, previously focused on weaponry turned back to demand goods and food. The 
pity situation of war-torn economies made it easy to detect profitable opportunities. 
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created as a judge of potential economic conflict among nations, capital 
controls were explicitly allowed, the dollar’s price was fixed in terms of gold.6 
The signers of the agreement had to keep their reserves in gold or dollars 
and had the right of exchanging their dollars for gold in the U.S. Federal 
Reserve at the official price. 
The IMF design allowed capital controls as means for the prevention of 
exchange crises and generated the possibility of exerting active monetary 
policies. The economists of the IMF were convinced that floating exchange 
rates were a cause of speculative instability that harmed international trade. In 
spite of this fact, it was afterwards demonstrated that nations were not willing 
to maintain free trade and a fixed exchange rate at the expense of 
unemployment in the long run. 
The agreement provided the nations a solution for the persistent deficits of 
the balance of payments that could spread up to extinguish the international 
reserves of the country. Countries could ask for a loan from the IMF, which in 
turn recommended macroeconomic adjustment policies to reestablish the 
balance of payments at a sustainable level. The Fund was minded to help its 
members to recover from large deficits in the current account. The resources 
came from a common pool of gold and foreign exchange provided by all its 
members. The main problem of using the IMF solution was the imposition of 
macroeconomic policies that countries had to follow if they wanted to get a 
loan. 
In this period the exchange rates could be modified if the IMF agreed that 
the balance of payments of a country was in a situation of a “fundamental 
disequilibrium”. The most important issue was that the meaning of this 
expression was not explicitly defined in the constitution of the Fund, but 
informally referred to countries who suffered permanently adverse 
international changes in the demand of their products. In these cases the 
countries could take traditional policies of adjustment, mainly through 
devaluations, making the exchange rate to oscillate and improve the 
competitiveness of the country. 
The IMF forced countries to make their national currencies convertible, 
favoring international trade7, which did not recover since the gold standard 
                                                 
6 It was fixed at 35u$s per troy ounce, which is equivalent to 31,103475 grams. 
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was abandoned at the beginning of the First World War. During this period the 
world moved towards the restoration of the flows. The Marshall plan had, in 
particular, a great impact because it provided dollars to liquidity lacking 
Europe, allowing the intra-European trade to be reestablished. 
This bonanza came to an end with the Oil Crisis of 1973, when the price of 
commodities grew rapidly as a result of the ensuing shortages. The energetic 
cost rose sharply in a context of low growth, investment falls, increasing 
unemployment and fiscal deficits. The conjunction of those factors started 
inflationary processes, changing the goals of policy. The eradication of 
inflation (inflation targeting) became aa main issue for countries. On the other 
hand, several speculative episodes, preceding the Oil Crisis, began to erode the 
foundations of the Bretton Woods agreement.8 
 
II.2. Second part - Floating exchange rate (1971/73....) 
 
During this period, the world economy recovered the international flows 
that existed during the gold standard and moved towards an increased 
integration. It was no longer necessary to control capital movements because 
floating exchange rates allowed adjustment through emission without reducing 
the reserves. The international flows increased rapidly due to the liberalization 
of the markets, to the point that international assets reached rates of more than 
50% of the GDP.9 
The deregulation of the capital flows was progressive. The first countries to 
enact them were Canada, Germany and Switzerland in 1973, followed by the 
USA in 1974, the United Kingdom in 1979, Japan in 1980, France and Italy in 
1990 and Spain and Portugal in 1992. For two decades the main economies of 
the world opened up to further exchanges with the rest of the world. A 
generalized belief was that the opening of the economy would not be 
accompanied by fluctuations and that instabilities in an economy could only 
spread slowly to the others. 
                                                                                                                     
7 Even so, most of the countries did not reestablish convertibility until the end of 1958, whereby 
the progress in the international trade was severely delayed. Japan was one of the last developed 
countries to reestablish convertibility in 1964. 
8 The most important ones took place in France in 1958, Canada in 1962, Italy 1963, United 
Kingdom in 1964 and France 1968. 
9 As a representative image of that integration of the capital market it is enough to watch the 
interest rates, which dispersion diminished with respect to earlier periods. 
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However the preceding vision was misguided because crises started to 
spread. The new system became highly volatile. Exchange rates, interest rates 
and prices of assets were subject to big fluctuations in the short run as well as 
to oscillations in the long run. Before trying to understand how the 
transnationalization of crises took place, it is important to highlight important 
aspects of the new international financial architecture. 
Three important processes took place, modifying the financial architecture 
in the developed world. Firstly,  there was a process ofbanking 
disintermediation. This feature was vital for the occurrence of the future events 
in the world economy. Savings become progressively more institutionalized 
and new financial entities had to be opened. The most important among those 
entities were the non-bank financial intermediaries: mutual funds and 
pensions, investment banks and insurance companies. The prevalence of 
traditional banks decreased and financial conglomerates appeared. This was 
accompanied by the deregulation of the activities of those intermediaries and 
the elimination of the capital controls. Additionally, secondary markets of debt 
securities and new sources of financing appeared which deepened the financial 
markets now endowed with high-tech tools. To handle these new complexities, 
rating agencies of credit risk were created to avoid the huge information costs 
of the bigger spectrum of investment possibilities generated. Secondly, there 
was a concentration of the financial system: At the beginning of the nineties 
started an intense process of fusions and acquisitions which was spectacularly 
accelerated in the first years of XXI century and which decreased the number 
of banks in almost all the countries of the world. The remaining banks not only 
became highly responsive to mismatches but also highly susceptible to the 
downfall of other banks. Moreover, some financial operations, mainly in the 
insurance markets and in the investment banks, became highly concentrated. 
Thirdly, new financial instruments were introduced. The investors began to 
demand a higher diversification of risk, inducing the creation of specialized 
markets. The main involved derivatives, whose complexity was nearly extreme 
(they were created by mathematicians and no longer by economists because 
they required complex algorithms to diversify the risk). In the emerging 
economies “junk bonds” appeared, which were bonds based on shares of 
foreign companies but without any asset securitization, being just shares of 
shares. These new instruments were the ones that generated the “subprime” 
crisis of 2007/2008. 
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The ensuing system became susceptible to the spread of the financial 
turmoil from some economies to other countries and markets which apparently 
had no relationship with the initial problem. 
Within the characteristics that engendered the volatility in the financial 
markets the most important was the insufficient regulation on both banks and 
financial intermediaries. Contagion problems arose among institutional 
investors due to weaknesses in the system of evaluation in the short run. 
Additionally, the rating agencies10 gained excessive importance: they followed 
procycliclal policies, overheating the economies in the boom phase and sank 
them during recessions. 
While recessions were scarce during this period, it is important to focus on 
the successive crisis suffered by the emerging countries. In Latin America, the 
eighties were considered a lost decade, but by the nineties they started a 
potential path of sustained growth which was undermined by further crises. 
The first crisis took place in Mexico in 1995, followed by Argentina in the 
same year, the South East Asia crisis of 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, 
and Turkey and Argentina in 2001, being this crises, the biggest in size and 
consequences. 
The flows toward the developing countries were modified. The multilateral 
credit organisms were no longer involved just in lending money to solve 
mismatches, but also in promoting long term development plans by means of 
loans, mainly in the emerging economies. 
Despite all the changes that the world financial architecture underwent, the 
predictions about the future of the world economy were not the best. The 
diagnosis at the beginning of the XXI century indicated that twin crises were 
increasingly frequent. There was evidence of volatility in capital flows because 
they basically were short-termed and had big contagion effects. Some 
countries were heavily indebted. Unsustainable growth paths started in this 
period and some countries conflicted with the IMF. 
The evolution of the system caused the crises to return to the developed 
economies. The comeback of the crises happened for two main factors that 
seemed to be isolated in the beginning but concurred to engender the crises. 
The first of them is that these economies went from being importers of foreign 
                                                 
10 Actually, doubts have been raised about the evaluations of risk made before the subprime 
crisis, because the rating agencies had shares of the main financial entities and therefore had 
incentives to underrate their risks. 
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savings, which helped them to maintain their growth paths, to be exporters of 
savings. Those savings were canalized to riskier and more volatile assets. New 
financial instruments were created with nearly no backing of any kind.11 
The banking system did not have any efficient mechanism to solve the 
problems of the period. A massive substitution of deposits took place, turning 
from constituting 70% of the liabilities in 1980 to be just the 40% in 2008.12 
This happened even though the banks provided help to obtain credits, 
canalizing the excess in world savings. 
The 2008 crisis started in the mortgages market in USA, but rapidly spread 
throughout the rest of the world. In order to characterize this crisis, a model 
proposed by Minsky was resurrected.13 The explanation presented by Minsky 
of how a financial crisis takes place focuses on a pattern that can be easily 
detected in the subprime crisis. Still, it is not enough to understand how a 
bubble that burst in the USA spread around the world with an incredible speed 
and magnitude. 
The relationship between the economies in the world could be seen in the 
integration of capital markets. The saving excess of the USA went to the 
acquisition of homes through mortgages for people without enough repayment 
capacity and whose collateral was only the increased value of those homes in 
an overheated housing market. Packages were made, chopping up those 
mortgages, which became disguised under more attractive names. The problem 
was that their only backing was the miracle of ever growing real estate prices. 
Those packages began to flow across the world without restrictions. 
When the bubble burst and became evident that most of the people with 
those mortgages collateralized by the high value of properties were not be able 
to repay them. The prices of houses fell down abruptly and the sales of 
mortgaged homes did not earn the banks enough money to recover the loans. 
This is how at first the most important investment banks of USA went into 
bankruptcy and then the rest of the banks with similar characteristics around 
the world followed because the money they had lent could not be recovered. 
 
                                                 
11 This case is the typical one of financial instruments created on the basis of mortgages that did 
not have any sustenance in the economic position of the debtor, who probably did not have any 
collateral to back his mortgage. 
12 The savings in this period were conveyed to capital markets and short term commercial values 
because they offered a larger profit, although the risk associated was unknown. 
13 There are other papers that analyze the origin of the financial crises. 
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III. Financial traps in the nineties in Latin America 
 
Globalization combines two processes that are complementary. On the one 
hand there is the adoption of institutions and legal measures which allow 
capitals to flow freely within the economy, moving from one sector to another, 
known as “market liberalization”. On the other hand, the total amount of 
capital that flow between countries increases. 
At the nineties several economies of Latin America, particularly the largest 
ones, started a new period of financial opening with a massive entry of capital. 
On the other hand they had to deal with a huge external debt generated in a 
previous round of financial opening.14 
At that moment it was believed that this was the kick-off to a long process 
of growth in capital flows and financial deepening at a worldwide level. It was 
thought that this process would lead to a complete integration of the 
developing countries to the international market. This perspective was 
motivated by the idea that a crisis was not possible in the context of that 
period. 
This reinsertion process into international markets suffered a sudden stop 
with the Mexican crisis of 1994/199515. This crisis revealed not only the risk at 
which the investors were exposed and the volatility of the capital flows but 
also the importance of the international entities such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. As a result of the intervention of these international entities the 
contraction suffered in the capital flows was mild and did not take too long to 
recover the foreign direct investment flows. 
The crises of Asia, Russia and Brazil consolidated the idea that financial 
globalization was a cyclic process in which, after a phase of reduction in the 
international capital flows, in the aftermath of a crisis, an incremental phase 
would ensue. This way of getting out of a crisis worked due to the great 
ability, of the international agencies of credit, to prevent debt defaults. 
However, since 1998 the process began to take a different direction. The 
net capital flows could not be recovered favorably because the risk premiums 
(associated to country risk) stayed systematically high. 
                                                 
14 The initial opening of the financial markets in Latin America took place in the seventies, and 
it ended with the financial and external crises of 1981 and 1982. 
15 The Mexican crisis suggested the ideas of sudden stops and contagion effects in Krugman 
(1997). 
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In several countries of the region growth in the capital account was not 
accompanied by increases in net exports, leading to deficits in the current 
account. The most important part of this problem can be assigned to the gap 
between the financial position of these countries and their position in the trade 
of goods in the world economy. Additionally, these countries could not 
increase their interest rates to attract new investment because the associated 
risk was excessively high. 
By the end of the nineties the countries of Latin America needed to 
refinance their debts to reduce the de.cit in current account due to the heavy 
debt and the lack of external supply of funds.16 
To understand how this process could take place it is important to highlight 
the complete deregulation of the capital flows while the exchange was fixed or 
almost fixed, the monetary policy was passive, and the real exchange rate 
appreciated systematically with its toll on the balance of trade. This forced the 
economies of the region to increase massively their indebtedness and 
increasing their vulnerability.17 
It was assumed that the integration to international financial markets of the 
developing countries would reduce the risk premiums, but this did not happen, 
at least until 2002. The experiences of the period after the Asian crisis revealed 
that the integration had been segmented. The interest rates required for 
attracting capital to these countries were systematically higher than the ones 
needed in the developed countries. 
Another fact which is evident from the above is the importance of a 
prudential regulation of capital flows, in spite of the claim that more regulation 
deepens the procycliclal character of capital flows. 
There are doubts about the incompatibility between a fixed exchange rate 
and the volatility of capital flows. While there is consensus on the need of 
flexibility in the exchange rate, the debate is still open. On one hand the fixed 
exchange rate discourages some specific short term capital flows, favoring a 
financial strengthening, but at the same time limiting the mechanisms to deal 
with imbalances. On the other hand, a floating exchange rate in a context of 
volatility of capital flows can generate uncontrollable increases in the volatility 
                                                 
16 This situation affected particularly Argentina and Brazil in 2001, and …finished with the 
default of the Argentinean debt and the closure of the credit market in Brazil at the end of 2002. 
17 This path was the one followed by Argentina in the nineties, Brazil from 1994 to 1998 and 
Mexico until 1995. 
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of the real and nominal exchange rate. Even though direct controls can help to 
raise the stability in the short run, the most important goal of a regulation 
policy should be the generation of capital flows with stable and predictable 
behavior, mainly in the medium and long run.18 
 
IV. Behavior of gross capital flows 
 
The objective of this section is to focus on the behavior of the capital flows 
of foreign and domestic agents -CIF: Capital in.ows by foreigners. CID: 
Capital in.ows by domestic agents- separately. 
In most of the databases commonly used the flows appear as entry of 
capital, whereby a negative CID represents an increase of the foreign assets 
hold by domestic agents and a positive CID means that domestic agents are 
reducing their holdings of foreign assets, which represents a repatriation of 
capitals. On the other hand, a positive value of CIF means that foreign agents 
are increasing their holdings of local assets, while a negative value of CIF 
represents a reduction of local assets by foreign agents. 
The explanation of why the variables are added to obtain CIF and CID will 
be presented in a later section of the paper together with an indication of the 
sources of data. 
In the last 40 years the financial globalization grew considerably, inasmuch 
as CIF had been persistently positive and CID always negative and their 
magnitudes increased along the period. It can be observed, in most of the 
databases, that the crisis of 2008 generated a large decrement of capital flows, 
which reflects in falls of CIF and raises of CID, the former taking negative 
values and the latter positive ones for several countries, being this behavior 
typical of capital flows at a period of crisis in the developed countries. 
Another important result obtained from the analysis of the information for 
different countries is a pattern of seemingly negative correlation between CIF 
and CID. In sum with the increase in financial globalization, the times series 
confirm that for 40 years, from 1970 up to now, the volatility of financial 
flows had increased. 
Taking into account the economic cycle, in which good times and 
recessions alternate, the capital flow response of foreign investors is pro 
cyclic, increasing the flow in periods in which real GDP grows. On the other 
                                                 
18 The main institution that promotes this kind of policies is ECLAC. 
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hand, due to the negative correlation of CIF and CID, the capital flows of 
domestic agents tend to be counter cyclical, implying that the residents in the 
country invest more abroad in periods of growth in real terms. The opposite 
case, in which the domestic agents reduce their flows of investment abroad and 
prefer to invest in their country during periods of crisis happens mainly in high 
income countries, while in developing countries can be doubted that this ever 
happens, mainly because there is a tendency to flight to quality. 
The two main stages of the economic cycle can be characterized as shown 
in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Behavior of capital flows during the economic cycle 
Increasing phase of the economic 
cycle 
Decreasing phase of the economic 
cycle 
The foreign agents increase their 
purchases of domestic assets while 
domestic agents increase their 
investments abroad. 
The foreign agents sell their domestic 
assets which are purchased by domestic 
agents that reduce their investments 
abroad. 
Financial globalization increase as a 
result of the new relationships 
between the agents of the different 
countries and their investments. 
Financial globalization decreases as a 
consequence of a reduction of the 
foreign capitals linked to the country 
and of the capitals of the country linked 
to foreign agents. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Previous studies showed a reduction of capital flows, both domestic and 
foreign, for the whole group of countries during crises. It can be clearly seen 
that during a period of crisis capital flows of foreigners fall rapidly and that 
local capital flows to their economy of origin in the year of the crisis, although 
in the next years their behavior is more volatile, probably because of the 
influence of structural factors of the economies to which they return that 
suppress the incentives to “back home” flow. Above all, the most important 
movement is represented by foreign capital, which not only diminishes its flow 
during periods of crises, but also remains depressed and does not recover until 
the second year after the end of the crisis. 
These results allow the observation of the possible mechanisms that take 
place during financial crises. A common explanation of crises is that they 
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originate in production or terms of trade shocks, but these crises-triggers are 
inconsistent with the results presented in the previous section since, during 
crises, there is not a simultaneous reduction of CIF and CID. In addition, not 
only no evidence exists of domestic agents selling their local assets during a 
period of crisis but also of domestic capital flying abroad during a crisis in its 
home country, but rather the local capitals are repatriated during periods of 
crisis. Also, crises affect asymmetrically foreigners and residents, as in 
situations like increases of default risk or expropriation of foreign-owned 
assets, also known as sovereign risk. 
Many stylized effects of great importance can be ascertained from the 
analysis presented in this section. In first place, while the volatility in the 
capital flows, CIF and CID, have increased over time, this raise did not 
translate into higher volatility of net capital flows, because CIF and CID are 
negatively correlated. In second place, the gross capital flows are procyclic, 
with CIF increasing and CID decreasing during expansions of the product. 
Finally, during crises the capital flows are significantly reduced, especially 
during severe crises and systematic crises. 
The behavior of gross capital flows can shed light on the source of the 
fluctuations and of the mechanisms underlying international capital flows. 
 
V. Methodolody and data 
V.1. Structural breaks and stationary tests 
 
The classic augmented Dickey-Füller (ADF) test with three different 
specifications (with trend, with drift and no constant) without structural breaks 
in the analyzed series shows, in general, that the series are not stationary. 
However, this result is not surprising when working with long time series. 
Common unit root test, such as Dickey-Füller (1984) or Perron (1989), tend 
to not reject the null hypothesis of unit root in presence of structural changes 
and conclude that the series is not stationary. There are tests that detect where 
a structural change happens, like Chow’s, but they require previous 
information about the existence of a possible break or use iteration to find 
them. A different path is followed in Zivot and Andrews’ (ZA) test (developed 
in 1992) which finds endogenously the break. 
The ZA test analyzes sequentially the possible presence of a structural 
change in the series at each of the observations, generating dummies in each 
period. The dummy with higher significance is taken as indicating the period 
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in which the series suffers a structural change. Even so, the test still has the 
format of a test of stationarity like the classic Dickey-Füller. 
The problem considered here differs from that considered in several recent 
works in the econometric literature that analyze the problem of testing for 
structural change with unknown change point. It is a way of testing for a unit 
root against the alternative of stationarity with structural change at some 
unknown point. It is not a test of structural break per se. 
We analyze three different versions of the test. The first model is specified 
to find a change in the drift and search for the maximum lag of the series 
through a t test. The second model is similar to the first one, but allowing 
changes only in the trend. The third model evaluates the likelihood of changes 
both in the trend and the drift and uses the AIC test to find the maximum lag of 
the series. For the three different specified cases we work at a significance 
level of 5%. 
Model I: Model with drift 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 +𝛹𝐷𝐼𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗𝑘𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑡                                  (1) 
 
Model II: Model with trend 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜆𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗𝑘𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑡                                   (2) 
 
Model III: Model with both specifications 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 +𝛹𝐷𝐼𝑡 + 𝜆𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗𝑘𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑡                     (3) 
 
where 𝛾 is the drift, 𝛽𝑡 is the trend, ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  are the specified lags and 
𝜇𝑡 is the disturbance error. 
As seen, the specification is similar to Dickey-Füller test and only adds the 
dummies 𝜆𝐷𝑇𝑡 and 𝛹𝐷𝐼𝑡 to capture a possible structural break, allowing 
changes in the trend or the drift, and find it endogenously. 
The null hypothesis in the three models is that 𝛼 = 1, which means that the 
series is integrated and has no structural break, whilst the alternative 
hypothesis rejects the stationarity and indicates the presence of a structural 
break in some part of the time series. 
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The attention is mainly focused on the third model because it keeps open 
the possibility of a break not only in the trend but also in the drift. The reason 
is that when specifying the first or the second model, if the real model were 
different, the test would lose a lot of power while if the model specified is the 
third when the real underlying model is either the first or the second one the 
loss of power is lesser. 
In order to complete the analysis of the time series we perform a test of 
structural break. We confront the results obtained from the unit root test of 
Zivot and Andrews with the results found using the test of structural break 
suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). This methodology considers the 
following multiple model with 𝑚 structural breaks: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡′𝛿1 + 𝜇𝑡,              𝑡 = 1,… ,𝑇1 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡′𝛿2 + 𝜇𝑡,              𝑡 = 𝑇1 + 1,… ,𝑇2 
……………………………………………….                                                 (4) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡′𝛽 + 𝑧𝑡′𝛿𝑚+1 + 𝜇𝑡,         𝑡 = 𝑇𝑚 + 1,… ,𝑇2 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable observed in moment 𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 is the matrix of 
the coefficients of the regression, 𝛽 and 𝛿𝑗(𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚 + 1) are the 
respective vectors of the coefficients and 𝜇𝑡 is the disturbance error. 
The breakpoints are (𝑇1, … ,𝑇𝑚) and are treated as unknowns. For this 
reason they are estimated along with the coefficients of the 𝑇 available 
observations in the sample. The null hypothesis in this test is the absence of 
breaks against the alternative of an unknown number of breaks. In addition, 
the test includes many 𝐹 tests (e.g. to test 𝑙 vs. 𝑙 + 1 breaks). Assuming a pure 
structural break as mentioned above, the whole structure changes, and we have 
that: 
 
𝑌 = ?̅?𝛿 + 𝑈                                                                                                     (5) 
 
where ?̅? is a diagonal block matrix, where each block corresponds to one of 
the 𝑚 specified regimes (𝑇1, … ,𝑇𝑚) and 𝛿 = (𝛿1′ , … , 𝛿𝑚+1′ ) are the 
coefficients that accompany the breaks. 
The breaks found are the ones that meet the following condition: 
 
�𝑇1� , … ,𝑇𝑚�� = 𝑎𝑟𝑔min𝑇1,…,𝑇𝑚 𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … ,𝑇𝑚)                                                  (6) 
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where 𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … ,𝑇𝑚) is the sum of the squared residuals resulting from the 𝑚 
partition selected. 
 
V.2. Data 
 
All the data used for the estimates of the present paper was extracted from 
the database of statistics and indicators provided by ECLAC, in its section of 
CEPALSTAT. Within the information provided by this institution, the data we 
use is drawn from the section of economic indicators, in the external sector of 
the economy, where the balance of payments can be obtained in a quarterly 
disaggregation. 
The countries that are part of the sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The variables used from the balance of payments are: Direct investment 
abroad, Foreign direct investment, Investment portfolio assets, Investment 
portfolio liabilities, Other investment assets, Other investment liabilities and 
Reserve assets. The rest of the variables presented in the balance of the 
financial account were not used because their values were almost negligible to 
be taken into account. All these variables are expressed in millions of dollars 
at current prices by CEPALSTAT. 
To form the Capital In.ows of Domestic agents (CID) we add the variables: 
Direct investment abroad, Portfolio investment assets, Other investment assets 
and Reserve Assets. To form the Capital In.ows of Foreign agents (CIF) we 
add the variables: Foreign direct investment, Portfolio investment liabilities 
and Other investment liabilities. Both CIF and CID are expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP, which was obtained from the IMF and the measure 
used was the GDP in billions of dollars at current prices, of the economy to 
which they belong to adjust the capital movements to the dimensions of the 
economy that originated them. 
 
V.3. Periods covered for each country 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of the periods that are covered for each 
country. The entries shown in this table are of the form year-quarter. So, for 
instance, 2001-3 means the third quarter of 2001. 
 
VOLATILITY OF THE CAPITAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURAL BREAKS... 
 
39 
Table 2 
 Periods covered for each country 
Argentina 1993-1 - 2010-2 Honduras 2004-1 - 2009-4 
Bolivia 1993-1 - 2009-4 Mexico 1980-1 - 2009-4 
Brazil 1979-1 - 2009-4 Nicaragua 1993-1 - 2006-2 
Chile 1993-1 - 2010-3 Panama 1998-1 - 2009-4 
Colombia 1993-1 - 2010-2 Paraguay 2000-1 - 2009-2 
Costa Rica 1999-1 - 2010-2 Peru 1993-1 - 2009-4 
Ecuador 1993-1 - 2010-1 Uruguay 1999-1 - 2009-4 
El Salvador 1999-1 - 2006-4 Venezuela 1994-1 - 2009-4 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: The first four numbers correspond to the year and the last number to the quarter, 
numbered from one to four. 
 
 
VI. Results of the test ZA and BP 
 
The results found shed light on an important topic: Not only the series are 
not stationary for the test used, but also it is possible to think that they have 
suffered regime changes during the studied period. 
Table 3 shows the results of ZA test with its suggested break dates. In that 
table, it can be observed the quarters at which the test suggests possible breaks. 
Except in some cases (Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) and just 
for some specifications, it was not significant. 
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Table 3 
 Results of ZA test with its suggested break dates. 
 CIF CID 
 Drift Trend Both Drift Trend Both 
Argentina 2005-3** 2002-4** 2005-3** 2002-2** 2005-3** 2006-1** 
Bolivia 2006-1** 2005-3** 2004-1** 2005-3** 2004-2* 2006-4** 
Brazil 2000-4** 1997-3** 2000-4** 2004-2** 2003-3 2002-2 
Chile 2006-1** 2004-1** 2004-3** 2001-4** 2004-3** 2002-3** 
Colombia 2000-1** 2004-4** 2000-1** 2000-1 2007-4 2002-4 
Costa Rica 2005-3** 2005-3** 2005-4** 2007-4** 2007-1** 1987-4** 
Ecuador 2001-1** 2004-1** 2001-3** 2000-1** 2000-3** 2000-1** 
El Salvador 2005-2** 2003-4** 2005-3** 2003-4** 2004-3** 2003-4** 
Honduras 2007-2** 2006-1** 2007-2** 2005-3** 2006-2** 2005-3** 
Mexico 1998-1** 1985-2** 1998-1** 2004-4** 1999-3** 2004-4** 
Nicaragua 1996-2** 1998-3** 2000-1** 1997-3** 1999-1** 1998-2** 
Panama 2002-2** 2002-3 2003-3 2001-4** 2002-2** 2001-3** 
Paraguay 2002-1** 2003-4** 2002-3** 2004-3** 2006-1** 2004-3** 
Peru 2004-3** 2004-3** 2002-2** 2007-2 2006-4 2006-3** 
Uruguay 2005-4** 2004-3 2005-4 2005-4** 2007-1** 2006-1** 
Venezuela 1997-3** 1996-4** 1996-4** 1997-4** 1996-4** 1997-2** 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: **; *: 1 and 5% of significance respectively. 
 
In the particular cases where the break is not significative it can be 
concluded that we are in presence of a unit root process without any 
exogenous structural break. 
To illustrate the table it is helpful to graph the dispersion of the potential 
breaks found. At first glance what can be seen are all the quarters suggested by 
the three models as breaks (adding the foreign and domestic agents’ capital 
flows breaks). 
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VI.1. Graph of accumulation of possible breaks 
 
Graph 1.  
Graph of all the breaks suggested by all ZA test’ models 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
Graph 1 is the graph of all the breaks suggested by all ZA test’ models It 
can be observed how the information is concentrated in the first part of the 
2000 decade, especially at the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. This is relative to 
the data used because for many countries the information was available only 
after 1995. 
By considering just the specification that allows breaks not only in the drift 
but also in the trend, it gets the following result.  
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Graph 2.  
Graph of all the breaks suggested by ZA test’ mix model 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
The second graph presents all the breaks suggested by ZA test´s mix model. 
As in the previous graph (graph 1), the breaks accumulate in the first part of 
the 2000s, but the division among years seems more uniform, without too 
much difference between the numbers of cases. This is due to the fact that in 
many cases the dispersion graph that included the three specifications the 
breaks suggested by two different specifications for one country and one type 
of flow (foreign or domestic agents) were the same. Anyway, with any graph 
the conclusion is the same: for almost all the countries we studied the ZA test 
suggested a break point during the first half of the 2000 decade. 
 
VI.2. Results of the BP test 
 
As mentioned above in the methodology section, the breaks suggested by 
the unit root test of Zivot and Andrews are going to be contrasted with Bai and 
Perron (BP) test. 
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The results obtained applying the BP test19 can be observed in the table 4. 
 
Table 4  
Results of BP test with its significative break dates. 
 Capital flows 
 CID CIF 
Argentina 2002-1**** N/S 
Bolivia 2002-1* N/S 
Brazil N/S 1999-3**** 
Chile 2001-3**** 1997-4**** 
Colombia 2000-2**** 1999-4**** 
Costa Rica N/S 2008-1*** 
Ecuador N/S N/S 
El Salvador N/S N/S 
Honduras N/A N/A 
Mexico N/S 1997-4**** 
Nicaragua N/S 1996-1**** 
Panama N/S N/S 
Paraguay N/S N/S 
Peru N/S 1999-4**** 
Uruguay N/S 2003-1**** 
Venezuela N/S N/S 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: *, **, ***, ****: Significant at 10, 5, 2.5 y 1% respectively. N/A: Not enough data to run 
the test. N/S: No significant break found. 
 
The  series analyzed in the table were in levels. It was also performed the 
analysis of the series in differences, although no significant breaks were found 
for any of them. 
In this section there were just used those breaks that the sequential 
procedure of the test found significant (indicating what percentage of 
significance they have). 
                                                 
19 Where the maximum number of structural changes allowed was set to 4. 
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Those significant breaks keep a distribution across countries similar to the 
one previously found, which means that they are located mainly at the end of 
the nineties and the first years of the 2000 decade. 
It is important to highlight that there are more significant breaks in the 
series of the foreign agents capital flows than in the domestic agents’ capital 
flows. 
 
VII. Contemporaneity with the crises 
 
An important analysis that can be made is to confront the potential breaks 
found with the summary of crises enumerated below. The crises that are taken 
into account can be of four types: currency, banking, domestic debt and 
external debt. We consider the year when the crisis begins as a “crisis period” 
if the same country did not suffer another crisis in the previous two years. 
Currency crises are defined by Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Frankel and 
Rose (1996). Banking crises are de.ned by Honohan and Laeven (2005), 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Domestic debt 
crises are identified with the year in which Standard & Poor labels the debt in 
local currency of an economy as being in a state of default and also with the 
information provided by Reinhart y Rogoff (2008). External debt crises are 
defined by Laeven and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and also 
by the year in which Standard & Poor labels the debt in foreign currency and 
the loans in foreign currency of the banking system of an economy as being in 
a state of default. 
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Table 5 
Episodes of crisis in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
Country Years in which a crisis was suffered 
Argentina 1980 - 1985 - 1995 - 2001 
Bolivia 1980 - 1985 - 1994 - 1999 
Brazil 1976 - 1982 - 1990 - 1999 - 2002 - 2008 
Chile 1975 - 1980 
Colombia 1982 - 1985 - 1998 
Costa Rica 1981 - 1987 - 1991 - 1994 
Ecuador 1980 - 1996 - 2008 
El Salvador 1981 - 1986 - 1989 - 1998 
Honduras 1981 - 1990 -1999 
Mexico 1981 - 1985 - 1994 
Nicaragua 1979 - 1985 - 1990 - 2000 
Panama 1983 - 1987 
Paraguay 1982 - 1989 - 1995 - 2001 
Peru 1978 - 1988 - 1999 
Uruguay 1978 - 1981 - 1987 – 2002 
Venezuela 1976 - 1982 - 1989 - 1993 – 2002 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
The episodes of crisis in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
are shown in table 5. To confront with the crises observed in the table 5 it is 
important to define contemporaneity. Two events are macroeconomically 
contemporary if the gap between them is less than two years. In this case the 
structural breaks will be confronted with the years in which the countries 
suffered crises. Table 6 presents information on the contemporaneity events 
between crisis and breaks for each country analysed.  
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Table 6 
Contemporaneity events between crises and breaks 
Country Year of crisis Suggested break (ZA) Significative break (BP) 
Argentina 2001 2003-3 (cid) 2002-1 (cid) 
Bolivia 1999 NC 2002-1 (cid)* 
Brazil 1999 2000-4 (cid) 1999-3 (cif) 
Brazil 2002 2002-2 (cif) NC 
Colombia 1998 2000-1 (cif) 1999-4 (cif) and 2000-2 (cid)* 
Costa Rica 1987 1987-4 (cid) NC 
Nicaragua 2000 2000-1 (cif) and 1998-2 (cid) NC 
Paraguay 2001 2002-3 (cif) NC 
Peru 1999 2002-2 (cif)* 1999-4 (cif) 
Uruguay 2002 NC 2003-1 (cif) 
Venezuela 1993 1996-4 (cif)* NC 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: *: Extending the contemporaneity to 2 years and a half. NC: No contemporaneity 
 
We can see that the breaks found in the first part of the 2000s may be due 
to the crises suffered by the Latin American economies in the late nineties and 
at the beginning of the XXI century. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
In the last 70 years the world financial architecture underwent huge 
changes. Even though these changes began mainly with the meeting held in 
Bretton Woods, the ones with larger impact happened in the eighties and 
nineties, during which banking disintermediation, concentration of the 
financial system and the creation of new financial instruments started a new 
era in the financial arena. In this context one of the largest crises in history 
began in the USA and spread to the rest of the world. Its aftermath can be 
observed even today in different economies of the planet. 
On the other hand, long before that crisis, and for almost two decades the 
countries in Latin America have been suffering successive economic crises. In 
the nineties the economies of the region began a new process of opening to the 
financial markets, thinking that this process would lead to a global insertion of 
these economies into international markets. This fact never happened: the risk 
premiums associated to them were persistently high and new investment was 
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hard to attract, being short term capitals the only ones that came to the region, 
increasing its instability. 
Analyzing the gross capital flows, dividing them between CID and CIF, it 
was argued above that the last years witnessed an increase of financial 
globalization, meaning that the residents of an economy invest more abroad 
while foreigners invest more in this economy. In addition, the gross capital 
flows have been procyclic, increasing their volume in booms and decreasing in 
depressions. Foreigners remove their holdings from an economy in crisis and 
domestic agents repatriate their investments abroad. As a consequence, it can 
be seen that a negative correlation exists between CID and CIF. 
Using ZA test it was obtained possible breaks that except in some cases 
(Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) and for only a few 
specifications they were significant. Whether taking into account all the 
specifications or just the more general one it can observed that possible breaks 
accumulate in the first half of the 2000s. 
By comparing the results with the crises selected for the countries under 
study it is clear that the crises suffered by the Latin American economies 
toward the end of the nineties and the beginning of this century present 
contemporaneity with several breaks in the series of capital flows at the 
beginning of the first decade of the XXIth century. 
The idea of contemporaneity was extended by using the BP test of 
structural break because Uruguay and Bolivia were added to the group of 
coincidences between crises and breaks, when the time interval is enlarged to 
two years (or two years and a half). 
This paper focuses in determining if the structural breaks found by the ZA 
and BP tests (suggested or significant) are contemporary (within two years and 
two years and a half) to the crises suffered by the Latin American countries. It 
is important to state that it is not an analysis of causality from one variable to 
the other, it is just temporary precedence. So, it cannot be assessed whether the 
breaks are produced by the crises or the crises are caused by the breaks (even 
though all the breaks found were preceded by a crisis). 
These arguments shed light on the vital need of establishing a better 
regulation of the capital flows in Latin America. The world financial 
architecture is setting weaker limits to international investment, and no 
substantial change seems in sight which could provide stability to the region. 
Countries should begin to take into account that successive crises undermine 
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the confidence they could generate and steady financial flows are necessary if 
they are seeking a more prosperous future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLATILITY OF THE CAPITAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURAL BREAKS... 
 
49 
References 
 
Andrews, D. and Zivot, E. (1992). “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the 
Oil-Price Shock and the Unit-Root Hypothesis.” Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics, Vol. 10(3): 251-270. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (1998). “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with 
Multiple Structural Changes.” Econometrica, Vol. 66: 47-78. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (2003). “Computation and Analysis of Multiple 
Structural Change Models.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 18: 1-22. 
Basu, S. and Taylor, A. M. (1999). “Business Cycles in International 
Historical Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15(2): 45-68. 
Brennan, M. J. and Cao, H. H. (1997). “International Porfolio Equity Flows.” 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 52(2): 1851-1880. 
Broner, F.,  Didier, T., Erce, A. and Schmukler, S. L. (2010). “Financial Crises 
and International Portfolio Dynamics”, draft. 
Broner, F., Martin, A. and Ventura, J. (2010). “Sovereign Risk and Secondary 
Markets.” American Economic Review, Vol 100(4): 1523-1555. 
Calvo, G. (1998). “Capital flows and capital market crises: The simple 
Economics of Sudden Stops.” Journal of Applied Economics, Vol 1(1): 35-54. 
Damill, M., Fanelli, J. M., Frenkel, R. and Rozenwurcel, G. (1993). 
“Crecimiento económico en América Latina: Experiencia reciente y 
perspectivas”. Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 33(130): 237-264. 
Dickey, D. A.,  Hasza, D. P. and  Füller, W. A. (1984). “Testing for Unit Roots 
in Seasonal Time Series.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
Vol. 79(386): 355-367. 
French-Davis, R. and Villar, V. (2003). “The Capital Acunt and Real 
Macroeconomic Stabilization: Chile and Colombia”, ECLAC (mimeo). 
Frankel, J. A. and Rose, A. K. (1996). “Currency Crashes in Emerging 
Markets: An Empirical Treatment.” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 
42(3-4): 351-366. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
50 
Frenkel, R. (2002). “Capital Market Liberalization and Economic Performance 
in Latin America”, in Eatwell, J. and Taylor, L. (eds.) International Capital 
Markets, Systems in Transition, Oxford University Press. 
Frenkel, R. (2003). “Globalization and Financial Crises in Latin America”, 
CEPAL Review, 80. 
Frenkel, R. (2008). “From the Boom in Capital In.ows to Financial Traps”, en 
J. A. Ocampo y J. Stiglitz (eds.), Capital Markets Liberalization and 
Development, IPD Book Series, Oxford University Press. 
Frenkel, R. and Rapetti, M. (2009). “A developing country view of the current 
global crisis: what should not be forgotten and what should be done.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics,Vol. 33(4):685-702. 
Honohan, P. and Laeven, L. (2005). “Systemic Financial Crises: Containment 
and Resolution.” Cambridge university Press. 
Jickling, M. (2010). “Causes of the Financial Crisis.” CRS-7-5700, R40173. 
Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S. and Reinhart, C. (1998). “Leading Indicators of 
Currency Crises”, IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 45(1): 1-48. 
Krugman, P. (1997). “Currency Crises”, mimeo. 
Mendoza, E. (2010). “Sudden Stops, Financial Crises and Leverage.” The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 100(5): 1941-1966. 
Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008). “Systemic Banking Crises: A New 
Database.” IMF Working Paper 224. 
Ocampo, J. A. (2003) “Capital-account and counter-cyclical prudential 
regulations in developing countries.” Series Informes y Estudios Especiales, 6, 
ECLAC, Santiago de Chile. 
Pazzi, J. (2006). “Capital Flows and Banking System Fragility.” Working 
Paper 329, Kellog Institute for International Studies, University of Notre 
Dame, USA. 
Perron, P. (1989). “The great crash, the oil price shock and the unit root 
hypothesis.” Econometrica, Vol. 57: 1361-1401. 
VOLATILITY OF THE CAPITAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURAL BREAKS... 
 
51 
Perron, P. (1989). “Testing For A Unit Root In A Time Series With A 
Changing Mean.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 8(2): 153-
162. 
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2008). “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic 
View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises.” NBER, Working Paper. 
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2008). “The Forgotten History of Domestic 
Debt..” NBER, Working Paper. 
Sen, A. (2003) .“Limiting behaviour of Dickey-Fuller t-tests under the crash 
model alternative.” Statistics and Probability Letters, Vol. 55(3): 257-268. 
 
 
